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Abstract The reverse order college draft gives the worst
teams in the National Football League (NFL) the oppor-
tunity to hire the best amateur talent. For it to work
effectively, teams must be able to identify the ‘‘best’’ tal-
ent. Our study of NFL quarterbacks highlights problems
with the draft process. We find only a weak correlation
between teams’ evaluations on draft day and subsequent
quarterback performance in the NFL. Moreover, many of
the factors that enhance a quarterback’s draft position are
unrelated to future NFL performance. Our analysis high-
lights the difficulties in evaluating workers in the uncertain
environment of professional sports.
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1 Introduction
In 1935 the Brooklyn Dodgers and Philadelphia Eagles of
the National Football League (NFL) (ProFootballRefer-
ence.com) entered into a bidding war for the services of
fullback Stan Kostkas, a fullback with the University of
Minnesota.1 When the bidding was done, Kostkas had
agreed to a $5,000 contract with the Dodgers. This contract
rivaled the pay of Bronco Nagurski, the player many
considered the best player in the NFL.
This bidding war led the owner of the Eagles—Bert
Bell—to propose the reverse-order draft. Specifically, Bell
argued that NFL teams should not compete for the services
of college talent. Bell proposed that NFL teams should
choose college players, and the worst teams from the
previous season should get to choose first.
Such a structure clearly benefitted Bell. Bell’s Eagles
were the worst team in 1935, and consequently when the
draft was instituted in 1936, Bell got to choose first. Despite
Bell’s obvious self-interest, defenders of the reverse-order
draft have seen this institution as key to the economic health
of a professional team sport. Specifically, the reverse-order
draft is considered a mechanism to enhance a league’s
competitive balance. By funneling the best amateur talent to
the worst teams, the worst teams are given an opportunity to
improve. Hence the differences between the best and
worst—at least theoretically—should lessen over time.
Although research on the impact a draft has on com-
petitive balance is hardly encouraging,2 the draft has been
shown to have a clear benefit to the league’s owners.
Studies have shown that the draft does depress salaries.
Evidence from North American major sports leagues
reveals that drafted players suffer monopsonistic exploita-
tion by team owners, with pay set below their contributions
to team revenues (Scully 1974; Krautmann 1999; KahnD. J. Berri
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1 The story of the birth of the NFL Draft is reported in Quirk and Fort
(1992, pp. 187–188). This story was also noted in Leeds and Von
Allmen (2008, p. 163), Fort (2006, p. 258), and Quinn (2008).
2 Quinn (2008) also reviewed research on the impact the draft has
had on competitive balance. This research indicates there is little
relationship between a reverse order draft and the level of competitive
balance.
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2000; Krautmann et al. 2009; Lehn 1982); see Quinn
(2008) for a good summary of the operation and effects of
player draft systems in the four major North American
sports leagues. This implies that, if a team does acquire a
very productive player, a team should be able to acquire
that production at a discount.
The focus of our research will be the NFL. Given that a
draft theoretically should allow a team to acquire produc-
tion at a discount, it is natural to wonder how good NFL
teams are at finding productive players.
2 Two prior studies
We are not the first to ask such a question. Both Cade
Massey and Richard Thaler (2005) and Hendricks et al.
(2003) offered examinations of the NFL draft. Before
moving on to our approach, we need to review the analysis
offered in these papers.
2.1 Massey and Thaler (2005)
The Massey and Thaler paper is essentially an analysis of
decision-making in the NFL Specifically, these authors
considered the surplus value of a draft pick, or the differ-
ence between the projected economic value of a pick and
the compensation cost of the player. This research indi-
cated that surplus value peaked in the second round of the
draft. In other words, the top picks in the draft were
overvalued by decision-makers in the NFL.
Massey and Thaler argued that the overvaluation of
first round picks was due to a combination of non-rational
expectations by team owners and mis-pricing of players.
At the root of player over-valuation was an inability on
the part of team managers to successfully predict the
performance of players in the NFL. Again, overvaluation
is estimated as the ‘surplus value’ of each draft pick.
Surplus value is specifically determined by comparing the
monetary value of each veteran (free agent) in the NFL
labor market to the actual compensation of drafted play-
ers. Utilizing data from 1991 to 2002, Massey and Thaler
find that ‘‘surplus value increases at the top of the order,
rising to its maximum of $750,000 in the top half of the
second round before declining through the rest of the
draft. Consequently, as noted, the treasured first pick in
the draft is, according to this analysis, actually the least
valuable pick in the first round! To be clear, the player
taken with the first pick does have the highest expected
performance (that is, the performance curve is monoton-
ically decreasing), but he also has the highest salary, and
in terms of performance per dollar, is less valuable than
players taken in the second round.’’ (Massey and Thaler
2005, p. 25).
Given Massey–Thaler’s findings, one might expect
teams that are picking at the top of the first round to do
everything they can to trade down. But teams often take the
opposite approach. A premium is often paid by teams to
move up from the first round. An example of this practice
is cited by Massey and Thaler. In 2004, the New York
Giants and the San Diego Chargers completed a trade
where the Giants were given the first pick in the draft and
the rights to sign quarterback Eli Manning (who later
became Most Valuable Player in the 2008 Super Bowl). In
exchange, the Chargers acquired the fourth pick, or the
rights to quarterback Philip Rivers. In addition to the rights
to Rivers, the Chargers were also given a third round pick
in 2004 and one-first round and one-fifth round pick in
2005. Hence, in order to move up just three spots in the
draft, the Giants surrendered three additional picks.
The Massey–Thaler study is certainly impressive, yet
not without its flaws. The authors essentially compare two
evaluations of NFL players. The first evaluation they
consider is before the draft and is essentially revealed by
where a player is taken on draft day. The second evaluation
they make is after the draft, and consists of games played,
games started and Pro Bowl appearances in the NFL.
Massey and Thaler find that these evaluations are not
consistent.
There is a problem, though, with comparing the two
evaluations. The formal empirical analysis offered by
Massey and Thaler uses surplus value of a draft pick as the
dependent variable in their regression model. This conflates
the expectation of player performance with monetary
compensation for that performance. Teams are essentially
predicting the success of a drafted player in the NFL and
pricing that player’s expected services over the duration of
initial contract.
To understand the problem with this approach one needs
to consider the empirical link between the draft and player
salary. Specifically, salary models for NFL positions are
considered more formally in a pair of companion papers by
the authors (Berri and Simmons 2009; Simmons and Berri
2009). Those papers analysed the reported pay of NFL
quarterbacks and running backs, respectively, and found
evidence of substantial positive salary premia, after con-
trolling for player experience and productivity, for players
drafted in rounds one and two, but not thereafter. These
premia persisted over a player’s career up to qualification for
free agency or up to a trade from the drafting team, which-
ever was earlier. In sum, where a player is drafted impacts his
future pay. And therefore it is hard to use data on future pay
to evaluate the quality of the initial draft choice.
Beyond this issue, we would also note that the Massey–
Thaler paper attempted to look at all positions on the field.
Consequently they had to look at measures that would apply
to all positions. As noted above, these authors considered
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games played, games started, and the probability of making
a roster or making the Pro Bowl. The problem with each of
these metrics is that they are really statements from deci-
sion-makers about who is better or worse. So the authors are
essentially using one statement from decision-makers to
evaluate the rationality of another statement.
2.2 Hendricks et al. (2003)
This same criticism would apply to a similar paper by Hen-
dricks et al. (2003). Their paper, though, had a different
theoretical orientation to Massey and Thaler. Hendricks et al.
argued that draft choices reflect different kinds of uncertainty
about a drafted players’ future productivity. In the college
system, schools are divided into different divisions. At the top
is a collection of schools—historically referred to as Division
IA—labeled the Bowl Subdivision. Within the Bowl Subdi-
vision we find schools with significantly greater resources to
spend on coaching and training facilities.
Beneath this grouping is the Championship Subdivision,
as well as Division II and Division III. These schools are
less homogenous, and hence performance of players is
harder to evaluate. There are two main consequences of
this separation in the pool of talent. First, players from the
non-Bowl Subdivision schools may be disadvantaged in
the draft process since there is greater uncertainty over the
reliability of their college performance measures. This is an
example of statistical discrimination. On the other hand,
some teams may be willing to take members of the
minority non-Bowl Subdivision group as risky propositions
in the hope of finding stars that will eventually deliver a
competitive edge over NFL opponents. This is an example
of ‘option value’, following Lazear (1986).
Intriguingly, Hendricks et al. find both aspects of
uncertainty to be valid in the hiring process for NFL
players at entry level. If teams are choosing between two
(predicted) star players out of college in the early rounds of
the draft, they tend to be risk-averse and opt for athletes
from the more visible Bowl Subdivision program. But in
later draft rounds, non-Bowl Subdivision players are
overvalued relative to top programs, supporting the option
value explanation. Note, though, that athletes from non-
Bowl Subdivision schools do not, according to Hendricks
et al., have longer or stronger NFL careers than drafted
players from superior programs. This reflects the inherent
uncertainty surrounding draft choices.
Like Massey and Thaler, Hendricks et al. sought to
examine all positions. Consequently Hendricks et al.
employed such variables as years played in the NFL, a
dummy variable indicating that a drafted player actually
appeared in the NFL, and percentage of player’s active NFL
years that he appeared in the Pro Bowl as dependent vari-
ables in their analysis of the NFL draft. None of these
variables, though, are direct measures of player performance
and as we previously noted, lead the authors to use one
evaluation by decision-makers to access the validity of
another evaluation.
2.3 Our approach
We wish to take a different approach to the above-cited
papers on NFL draft. Specifically, we seek to offer an
evaluation of decision-making that is less dependent on
actual decisions. In other words, we wish to use explicit
player performance measures.
Such an approach in football, though, is problematic.
Performance metrics vary across positions. Consequently, to
properly address decision-making one would have to adjust
one’s analysis to each position examined. Given this reality,
we will focus our study on just one position, the NFL
quarterback.
The quarterback is the only position in football that is
credited by observers of the game directly with wins and
losses. As a consequence, the player who starts in this
position is often thought of as the face of the franchise. The
importance of this position suggests that teams would
devote most of their decision-making resources to get the
choice of quarterback ‘‘right.’’
To assess whether or not this is true, we will investigate
the following questions:
• What is the relationship between a quarterback’s draft
position and his subsequent performance in the NFL?
• What factors do NFL teams consider in drafting a
quarterback?
• How do the factors the NFL teams consider in drafting
a quarterback related to subsequent performance?
The answer to these questions will begin with a dis-
cussion of how performance of quarterbacks is measured.
We will then examine the link between draft position and
NFL performance. This will be followed by a model
designed to predict draft position and an additional model
linking what is known on draft day to performance in the
NFL. Concluding observations will close the paper.
3 Measuring the performance of quarterbacks
To study quarterbacks in the NFL one must first have a
measure of player performance. And the most commonly
cited statistic is the NFL’s quarterback rating measure. But
as the following equation reveals, it is hardly a simple or
intuitive metric.3
3 ESPN.com, as well as other web sites, reports the equation for the
NFL’s quarterback’s rating.























where COMP = Completions, PASSYDS = Yards pass-
ing, PASSTD = Touchdown passes thrown, INT = Inter-
ceptions thrown, PASSATT = Passing attempts.
This rating was devised by Don Smith in 1971, at the
behest of NFL commissioner Pete Rozelle. Smith wanted
to derive a rating for quarterbacks that was independent of
how other quarterbacks performed. To do this, Smith began
with the four available measures of quarterback passing
performance: pass completion rate, pass yards, touchdowns
and interceptions. He then assumed that average perfor-
mance in each measure would score one point, spectacular
performance would earn two points while poor perfor-
mance would earn zero points. Smith then experimented
with a set of weights of the four measures until he even-
tually arrived at the above formula. This formula—despite
its opaqueness—remains prominent in telecasts and other
media coverage to this day. This is primarily because the
NFL has given official approval to the measure.
Although the calculation of this measure lacks intuition,
the quarterback rating does have some meaningful content.
The four selected passing indicators are all likely to be
correlated (positively with the exception of interceptions
per attempt) with team wins. But there are two major flaws
with the rating measure. First, the weights are arbitrarily
imposed and may be inappropriate. Second, quarterbacks
do occasionally run (scramble) with the football and this
dimension of performance is disregarded altogether in the
rating measure.
Given these issues, we will also employ a metric ini-
tially detailed in Berri et al. (2006) and Berri (2007). These
works began with empirical models designed to explain
both points scored and points surrendered in the NFL. Such
models were employed to assess a quarterback’s marginal
physical product, i.e., the contribution of a quarterback to
team wins. Such an approach follows in the tradition of
Blass (1992), who assessed the value of baseball hitters to
their teams by regressing runs scored by hitters on a set of
batter statistics (including singles, doubles, stolen bases,
walks, etc.). Two models were employed to measure team
offense and team defense in the NFL. For offense, the team
performance is split into four stages of the game: offensive
ball acquisition, offensive ball movement, offensive ball
retention and offensive scoring. Each stage comprises a set
of independent variables. Evaluation of defensive perfor-
mance follows in similar manner. It is important to note
that the imputed effects of underlying covariates on the two
quarterback metrics (net points and quarterback score) are
derived from regression coefficients rather than just
imposed as Don Smith did for his quarterback rating.
The models of Berri et al. (2006) and Berri (2007) were
used to derive the value in terms of net points and wins, of
passing yards, rushing yards, passing attempts, rushing
attempts, sacks, interceptions, and fumbles lost. The value
of each factor—in terms of net points and wins—is
reported in Table 1. These values can be used to measure a
quarterback’s contribution to both scoring—or Net
Points—and Wins Produced. The calculation of each
measure simply involves multiplying the values—associ-
ated with either Net Points or Wins Produced—in Table 1
by each quarterback’s production of each statistic.
Another metric, QB Score, is even easier to calculate.
QB Score = All Yards  3  All Plays  30
 All Turnovers ð2Þ
where
All yards ¼ Passing yardsþRushing yards
 Yards lost from sacks
All Plays ¼ Passing attempts þ Rushing attempts þ Sacks
All Turnovers ¼ Interceptions þ Fumbles lost
(Data on fumbles lost is only tabulated by Yahoo.com from
1994 to the present. So for this study, only interceptions are
used to calculate QB Score, Net Points, and Wins
Produced.)
The simpler measure is derived from normalizing the
value of plays and turnovers around one yard. For example,
as seen in Table 1, each play is worth about three yards and
each turnover costs about 30 yards.4 As noted in Berri
(2007), the correlation between QB Score per play (or QB
Score divided by all plays) and Net Points per play (or Net
Points divided by All Plays) is 0.98.
All of the measures of quarterback performance con-
sidered so far are infected by the performance of team-
mates. For example, fumbles lost will impact QB Score
(but not quarterback rating). The fumble could be attrib-
utable to the center who delivers (snaps) the ball to the
quarterback, to a running back who fails to take the ball
from the quarterback, or the quarterback himself; or even
some combination of the three. Similarly, the responsibility
of interceptions will be shared between quarterback and
receiver. Sacks, where opponents hit the quarterback
behind line of scrimmage before release of the football
4 Specifically, from Table One we see that a play that does not
produce any yards will cost a team -2.7 points. An interception will
cost a team 34.5 yards while the cost of losing a fumble is 36.4 yards.
As noted in Berri (2007), the value of 30 for a turnover is chosen for
simplicity.
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causing loss of yards and down, will be influenced by the
offensive line and opposition defense. All of these inter-
actions indicate that it’s not possible to convincingly iso-
late quarterback performance from other team members in
a simple performance metric. This point needs to be
remembered as we progress in our analysis.
With our metrics in hand we can now turn to the eval-
uation of the NFL draft. And this evaluation starts with a
simple question: Do quarterbacks taken higher in the draft
out-perform those taken later?
4 Draft position and NFL performance
We begin with season data on quarterbacks that met the
following criteria5:
• the quarterback was drafted from 1970 to 2007
• the quarterback was chosen between picks 1 to 250
• the quarterback played in at least one game in the
season
In all we have 1,943 season observations drawn from
331 different quarterbacks.6 This sample was divided into
five, roughly equal, segments. For these five segments we
measured the quarterback’s performance with respect to
QB Score, Net Points, Wins Produced, and the NFL’s QB
Rating (as well as the elements of this rating).
The results, reported in Table 2, indicate that with
respect to the aggregate measures, where you are chosen
impacts the results. The lower a quarterback’s draft status
(with the number one pick being the lowest), the better
aggregate and per game numbers we see.
When we look at per-play numbers, though, the story
changes. On a per play basis, quarterbacks chosen with
picks 11–50, as well as picks 51–90, outperform quarter-
backs chosen in the top 10. Such a result suggests that top
10 quarterbacks really don’t offer more, they just get to
play more. And the story doesn’t change when we look at
the NFL’s QB Rating measure (which is a per pass attempt
metric). Whether we look at the aggregate QB Rating
measure, or the elements of the QB Rating metric, the same
story is told. Quarterbacks taken in the top 10 are outper-
formed by signal callers taken from 11 to 90.
Although the numbers reported in Table 2 suggest that
quarterbacks taken at the top of the draft are not any
better than those taken later, there is another possibility.
This is a reverse order draft, so those chosen in the top
10 are going to relatively poor teams. Perhaps the quality
of teams hiring the top ten picks is lowering their
numbers.
To examine this possibility we took two different views
of the relationship between a quarterback’s performance at
different points of their career and the quarterback’s draft
position. First we looked at how a quarterback’s perfor-
mance at each year of experience. For each year, only
quarterbacks who logged at least 100 plays were consid-
ered. As Table 3 indicates, the strongest correlation
remains between pick and plays. The per play metrics, as
well as the per pass attempt measures, are all very weakly
correlated with where a player was chosen.
In Table 4 we take a slightly different approach. Instead
of looking at a quarterback’s performance at each year of
experience, we considered his aggregate performance after
Table 1 Value of various
quarterback statistics in terms of
net points and wins
Source: Berri et al. (2006) and
Berri (2007)
Variable Value of each variable
in terms of net points
Value of each variable
in terms of wins
Yards (rushing yards and passing yards) 0.08 0.002




Fumbles lost -2.9 -0.082
5 The NFL and AFL merged before the start of the 1970 season.
According to ProFootbalReference.com, from 1970 to 1976 the
NFL’s draft consisted of 17 rounds and at least 442 picks. From 1978
to 1992 the draft was only 12 rounds (and from 330 to 336 picks). For
the 1993 season the NFL draft was eight rounds and 224 picks. After
the 1993 season the draft was only seven rounds. In 1994 there were
only 222 picks. But after 1994 the number of picks exceeded 250 (but
never exceeding 262 picks) in all but three seasons. Consequently we
settled on a cut-off of pick 250 for our study. Quarterbacks chosen
after 250 were not considered for this examination.
6 Our NFL performance data on quarterbacks was taken from
sports.yahoo.com. (http://sports.yahoo.com/nfl/stats/byposition?pos=
QB). The NFL has changed quite a bit since 1970. Consequently,
to compare quarterbacks across this time period one has to adjust the
numbers. Specifically, we calculated a quarterback’s relative perfor-
mance with respect to each statistic. This calculation began by cal-
culating the average performance in each statistic from 1970 to 2007.
Then in each year we subtracted the average in that statistic from that
season from each quarterback’s performance in that statistical mea-
sure. We then added the average performance across the entire period.
For example, in 1975 Terry Bradshaw’s net points per play was 0.162.
The average quarterback in 1975 posted a net points per play mark of
0.088 while the average mark from 1970 to 2007 was 0.144. Given
these numbers, Bradshaw’s relative net points per play in 1975 was
Footnote 6 continued
0.220, or [(0.162-0.088) ? 0.144]. It is these relative numbers that
were used in our analysis of quarterbacks from 1970 to 2007.
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each year of his career. Again only quarterbacks with at
least 100 plays to that point of their career were considered.
And again, we do not find much of a relationship between
per play, or per pass attempt measures, and where a
quarterback was chosen. We do find a much stronger
relationship between career plays and draft status.
All of this suggests that where a quarterback is chosen
impacts how much he plays. But it does not appear strongly
related to how well a quarterback plays.
Of course one wonders why draft status and perfor-
mance are so weakly related. To further address this issue
we next consider the factors that impact where a player is
chosen in the draft.
5 Determining draft position
Every quarterback chosen in the draft played college foot-
ball. At the time of the draft we know what a quarterback
did on the college football field. In other words, we can
measure QB Score, Net Points, Wins Produced, and the
NFL’s QB rating for a quarterback’s college career. And of
course we also have data on all the elements of QB rating
(completion percentage, passing yards per attempts, etc.…).
Beyond performance, we also have data from the NFL’s
scouting combine. The NFL Scouting Combine (specifi-
cally called the National Invitational Camp) began in 1982
in Tampa, Florida. Since 1987 it has been held in India-
napolis, Indiana. At the combine players take medical
exams, as well as both physical and psychological tests.7
From these tests we learn a quarterback’s height, weight,
how fast he runs (in the 40 yard, 20 yard, and 10 yard
dash), his vertical jump, his broad jump, and how fast he
runs the shuttle and cones.8
Quarterbacks also take the Wonderlic test. The Won-
derlic test—according to Wonderlic.com—was developed
by industrial psychologist Eldon F. Wonderlic in 1937. The
principle purpose of this test is to assess mental agility. NFL
Table 2 Performance of NFL quarterbacks chosen at different points in the NFL draft years: 1970–2007
Picks Observations Games Plays QB score Net points Wins
Picks 1–10 396 4,370 131,965 217,399 19,004 485.2
Picks 11–50 400 3,993 108,765 185,866 16,204 414.4
Picks 51–90 372 3,190 72,958 122,239 10,659 272.2
Picks 91–150 413 3,298 68,689 103,575 9,073 230.0
Picks 151–250 362 2,887 54,293 86,734 7,567 192.5
Picks Observations QB score per game Net points per game Wins per game
Picks 1–10 396 49.7 4.3 0.111
Picks 11–50 400 46.5 4.1 0.104
Picks 51–90 372 38.3 3.3 0.085
Picks 91–150 413 31.4 2.8 0.070
Picks 151–250 362 30.0 2.6 0.067
Picks Observations QB score per play Net points per play Wins per play
Picks 1–10 396 1.647 0.144 0.368
Picks 11–50 400 1.709 0.149 0.381
Picks 51–90 372 1.675 0.146 0.373
Picks 91–150 413 1.508 0.132 0.335










Picks 1–10 396 56.09 6.78 0.0396 0.0381 74.4
Picks 11–50 400 56.73 6.86 0.0419 0.0375 76.3
Picks 51–90 372 56.43 6.86 0.0404 0.0392 74.8
Picks 91–150 413 55.26 6.73 0.0386 0.0403 72.3
Picks 151–250 362 55.79 6.77 0.0385 0.0402 72.9
7 The history of the NFL’s National Invitational Camp can be found
at (http://www.nflcombine.net/?q=node/9).
8 Combine data from 1999 to 2008 can be found at nfldraftscout.com.
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Table 3 Correlation between draft position and performance at different levels of experience years: 1970–2007 minimum 100 plays in year
examined
Experience QB score Net points Wins QB score per play Net points per play Wins per play
1 -0.14 -0.15 -0.14 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03
2 -0.10 -0.11 -0.10 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05
3 -0.15 -0.16 -0.16 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06
4 -0.17 -0.17 -0.17 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05
5 -0.19 -0.20 -0.19 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04
6 -0.10 -0.11 -0.11 0.04 0.03 0.03
7 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03
8 -0.22 -0.21 -0.21 -0.18 -0.18 -0.18
9 -0.20 -0.20 -0.20 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06










1 -0.26 0.03 -0.05 0.07 0.03 0.01
2 -0.21 -0.07 0.04 0.16 0.12 0.00
3 -0.29 -0.09 -0.02 -0.14 0.09 -0.12
4 -0.25 -0.07 -0.03 -0.19 0.10 -0.14
5 -0.32 -0.04 0.07 0.01 0.11 -0.04
6 -0.23 0.02 0.09 -0.05 0.09 -0.03
7 -0.14 0.02 0.02 -0.12 0.11 -0.09
8 -0.22 -0.20 -0.19 -0.15 0.05 -0.20
9 -0.31 -0.02 0.01 0.02 0.13 -0.07
10 -0.19 0.05 -0.06 -0.08 0.27 -0.16
Table 4 Correlation between draft position and career performance at different levels of experience years: 1970–2007 minimum 100 plays in
year examined
Experience QB score Net points Wins QB score per play Net points per play Wins per play
2 -0.23 -0.24 -0.23 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10
3 -0.22 -0.23 -0.23 -0.01 -0.01 0.00
4 -0.25 -0.26 -0.26 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06
5 -0.26 -0.27 -0.26 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02
6 -0.29 -0.30 -0.30 -0.06 -0.06 -0.07
7 -0.29 -0.30 -0.29 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01










2 -0.38 -0.05 -0.10 0.06 0.05 -0.03
3 -0.40 -0.06 -0.04 -0.04 0.09 -0.05
4 -0.40 -0.01 -0.01 -0.08 0.02 -0.08
5 -0.43 -0.01 -0.02 -0.12 0.00 -0.06
6 -0.46 0.00 0.00 -0.11 0.08 -0.10
7 -0.46 0.07 0.01 -0.12 0.02 -0.04
8 -0.46 0.05 -0.04 -0.14 0.02 -0.06
Equation (3)
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quarterbacks need to read opposition defense formations
and tactics in a period of just a few seconds. They also need
to assess whether the original play that was called by the
coaches is feasible and, if not, need to be prepared to
improvise. These tasks require considerable mental capa-
bilities. The test utilized by the NFL consists of 50 ques-
tions and must be answered in 12 min. The average score of
all people who take the test (it is not just taken by NFL
prospects) is 21.9 For the NFL quarterbacks in our data
set,10 the average score was 26.1, with a range from 10 to
42.
From 1999 to 2008 there were 132 quarterbacks selected
in the NFL draft. For all of these we have data on draft
position, height, and weight. But the other elements of our
data set were not consistently available. Specifically, for
one quarterback we could not find a 40 yard dash time. For
another three quarterbacks we could not locate college
performance statistics.11 And for eight quarterbacks there
was no report of a Wonderlic test. In all, we only had
complete data for 121 quarterbacks.12
With data in hand we first wish to see how the combine
data related to performance. Specifically we regressed a
quarterback’s Wins Produced from his last year in college
on his height, his body mass index (BMI),13 BMI squared,
Wonderlic score, and time in the 40 yard dash. The results
indicate that none of these factors are related to a
quarterback’s college performance.14 Such results indicate
that the combine measures are not able to capture key
attributes of the quarterback.15
We then turned to the relationship between where a
quarterback was chosen in the draft and both his perfor-
mance his senior year as well as his combine numbers.
Specifically we estimated the following model:
PICK ¼ a0 þ a1  Height þ a2  BMI þ a3  BMI2
þ a4  Wonderlic þ a5  40 Yard Dash Time
þ a6  Dummy for non-Division I-A quarterbacks
þ a7  PERFORMANCE þ et ð3Þ
where Pick = where a quarterback is chosen in the draft,
Height = quarterback’s height in inches, BMI = Body
Mass Index, Wonderlic = Score on the Wonderlic test.




Career Plays and Wins Produced per play
Career Plays and Net Points per play
Career Plays and QB Score per play
Career Plays and QB Rating
Career Plays, Completion Percentage, Interceptions per
Attempt, and Passing Yards per Attempt
Equation (3) was estimated with data from 1999 to
2008. If we did not include any performance data our
sample consisted of 124 quarterbacks. When performance
is measured with Wins Produced, Net Points, and QB Score
our sample falls to 121. And when we include the per play
measures and Career Plays,16 our sample falls to 98. The
results are reported in Table 5.
9 Information on the number of test questions, the time given for the
test, and average score in the population was taken from an article
published in The USA Today by Chappell (2006).
10 The Wonderlic scores we utilized were taken from NFL Quarterback
Wonderlic Scores (http://www.macmirabile.com/wonderlic.htm). This
is a website maintained by Mac Mirabile. As Mirabile notes, ‘‘… these
results represent research and generally come from reliable sources, i.e.,
Notes from NFL scouts, newspaper articles. It is important to under-
stand that scores cannot by ‘‘verified’’ since they are not released by the
NFL, but rather leaded by teams or scouts.’’.
11 Data on college quarterbacks since 2000 was taken from the
NCAA’s website reporting Division I Football Statistics (http://web1.
ncaa.org/d1mfb/mainpage.jsp?site=org). College data for quarter-
backs selected in the 1999 and 2000 drafts was taken from
CNNSI.com.
12 Data on 20 yard and 10 yard dash times, vertical jump, broad
jump, and the shuttle and cone test was reported for fewer than 90
quarterbacks in our sample. Consequently these variables were not
included in our study.
13 According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(cdc.gov), the Body Mass Index is calculated by first dividing Weight
(in pounds) by height (in inches) squared. This number is then
multiplied by 703. A score of 18.5 indicates that a person’s weight is
below normal. A score between 18.5 and 24.9 is considered normal. A
BMI from 25.0 to 29.9 is indicates a person is overweight. And scores
above 30.0 are indicative of an obese person. In our sample of NFL
quarterbacks the average BMI score was 27.8, with a range from 24.4
to 31.5. The CDC notes that ‘‘highly trained athletes may have a high
BMI because of increased muscularity rather than increased body
fatness.’’ [http://www.cdc.gov/nccdphp/dnpa/healthyweight/assessing/
bmi/adult_BMI/about_adult_BMI.htm#Interpreted].
14 This is true whether we measure performance with QB Score, Net
Points, Wins Produced, or the NFL’s QB Rating. These results are
available from the authors upon request. When we turn to per play
measures of QB Score, Net Points, and Wins Produced, we do find
that faster times in the 40 yard dash lead to reduced levels of per play
performance (at the 10% level of significance). The adjusted
R-squared from these regressions, though, is in the negative range
and the F-statistic is statistically insignificant. Such results indicate
that there is little relationship between the combine statistics and per
play performance.
15 These results might also indicate that our Wins Produced measure
of college performance is imperfect.
16 Career Plays is the number of plays a quarterback participated in
throughout his college career. We only were able to collect career
numbers on 105 quarterbacks taken from 2001 to the present. The
inclusion of this variable was inspired by an article by David Lewin
posted at ESPN.com [College Stats Don’t Lie (April 17, 2008):
http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=3350135]. Lewin argued
in this article that NFL performance was influenced by only two
statistics, games started in college and completion percentage.
Lewin’s full results were not published, but he did indicate that his
sample consisted of ‘‘highly drafted quarterbacks since 1996.’’ We
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Table 5 reports that PICK is statistically related—at the
90, 95, or 99% level—in every formulation of the model to
a quarterback’s Height, Wonderlic score, 40 yard dash
time, and being a non-Division I-A player.17 Specifically
we find that taller, smarter, faster quarterbacks who play at
Division I-A schools are likely to be picked higher in the
draft, notwithstanding the lack of correlation of these
Table 5 Estimation of Eq. (3) dependent variable is PICK white heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Constant 4963.03 5069.79 5065.02 5069.76 4425.82 4446.79 4441.62 4213.52 4559.40
3.04 3.06 3.05 3.05 2.27 2.29 2.29 2.19 2.45
Height -19.55 -18.82 -18.85 -18.90 -15.31 -15.23 -15.26 -15.55 -14.87
-4.24 -4.11 -4.12 -4.13 -2.51 -2.50 -2.51 -2.50 -2.39
BMI -272.67 -277.33 -276.98 -277.06 -249.66 -251.20 -250.71 -233.46 -269.85
-2.42 -2.40 -2.40 -2.40 -1.81 -1.83 -1.82 -1.71 -2.03
BMI Squared 4.68 4.76 4.75 4.75 4.24 4.27 4.26 3.96 4.59
2.33 2.33 2.32 2.32 1.74 1.75 1.75 1.63 1.95
Wonderlic -1.94 -2.09 -2.09 -2.09 -2.72 -2.71 -2.72 -2.63 -2.70
-1.82 -2.00 -2.00 -2.00 -2.37 -2.37 -2.37 -2.26 -2.29
40 yard dash 128.81 119.65 120.07 119.94 134.91 134.57 134.67 138.43 153.21
3.16 2.81 2.82 2.82 2.53 2.53 2.53 2.58 2.81
Division I-AA dummy 55.96 57.60 57.43 57.27 56.36 57.23 56.95 53.75 63.02
3.31 3.23 3.22 3.21 2.30 2.34 2.33 2.15 2.64
Career plays – – – – -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03
– – – – -1.98 -1.99 -1.98 -1.61 -1.95
Wins produced – -13.77 – – – – – – –
– -3.00 – – – – – – –
Net points – – -0.36 – – – – – –
– – -2.95 – – – – – –
QB score – – – -0.03 – – – – –
– – – -2.95 – – – – –
Wins produced per play – – – – -15.09 – – – –
– – – – -2.46 – – – –
Net points per play – – – – – -72.39 – – –
– – – – – -2.58 – – –
QB score per play – – – – – – –191.75 – –
– – – – – – -2.54 – –
QB rating – – – – – – – -0.79 –
– – – – – – – -1.89 –
Completion percentage – – – – – – – – 46.75
– – – – – – – – 0.35
Interceptions per attempt – – – – – – – – 1574.60
– – – – – – – – 2.62
Yards per attempt – – – – – – – – -10.41
– – – – – – – – -1.17
Adjusted R-squared 0.196 0.225 0.224 0.224 0.214 0.217 0.216 0.198 0.222
Number of observations 124 121 121 121 98 98 98 98 98
Footnote 16 continued
did not have data on games started for all the quarterbacks selected
since 1999, but we do think the number of career plays would be
highly correlated with the number of games started in a quarterback’s
career.
17 The NCAA groups teams into Division I-A (now called the
Football Bowl Subdivision), Division I-AA (Football Championship
Subdivision), Division II, and Division III. Of the 132 quarterbacks in
our sample, only 16 did not come from a Division I-A school. Our
results indicate that not playing in the Football Bowl Subdivision
reduces your draft position by 56–63 slots, or nearly two rounds.
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measures with our college performance measure. Addi-
tionally, body mass index and its square are significant in
some formulations. For example, in column 2, we see that
the relationship between draft pick and body mass index is
U-shaped. As body mass index rises from its minimum
value in our sample, college quarterbacks tend to be drafted
earlier. But (from column 2), beyond the within-sample of
29.1 a further increase in body mass index is associated, for
given height and other variables, with being picked later in
the draft.
It is important to note that we also included a dummy
variable for race (equal to one if the player was black) but
this was not significant. Despite this result, there are vari-
ations in the combine data by race. Specifically, on the
Wonderlic test, the 30 black quarterback’s averaged only a
20.2 score while the white quarterback’s scored a 27.7.
White quarterbacks were also taller (75.3 inches vs. 74.3)
but slower in the 40 yard dash (4.85 s vs. 4.68). When we
turn to performance, blacks on average offered more.
Blacks on average have a higher QB rating, QB Score per
play, Net Points per play, and Wins Produced per 100
plays.18 Despite these differences, though, the average
black quarterback was only selected six slots ahead of the
average white signal caller (118.0 vs. 124.5).
When we look at the entire sample of black and white
quarterbacks we see that nearly 20% of the variation in a
quarterback’s draft position is explained by just the com-
bine factors. When we add a performance measure, our
explanatory power rises less than 3%. In other words, the
combine factors appear to be more important than the
actual college performance of the quarterbacks.19 These
results suggest that NFL scouts are more influenced by
what they see when they meet the players at the combine
then what they players actually did playing the game of
football.20 There are two possible explanations for this
result. First, the combine measures isolate the quarterback
and are not influenced by other players on the team and the
opposition. Although the lack of real game competition
appears to be a disadvantage, it may be an advantage for
scouts in helping them to assess quarterbacks as individu-
als. Second, the combine measures may actually be cor-
related with intangible quarterback attributes not revealed
by college performance indicators. Nevertheless, it does
not follow that the scouts’ assessments of quarterbacks will
translate effectively into successful NFL playing career
performance and we proceed to consider this in Sect. 6.
6 Connecting draft data to future performance
We now turn to the question of how the factors known on
draft day relate to future NFL performance. This is a
somewhat difficult issue to address. We have data on what
quarterbacks did in college. And we have information from
the NFL combine for each quarterback. But what perfor-
mance should we use as the dependent variable?
The first issue is an adequate sample of performance
data. Specifically, we need enough data on NFL perfor-
mance to develop a reasonable assessment of a quarter-
back’s performance. Following the practice noted earlier,
we will only look at quarterbacks who logged at least 100
plays. Of the quarterbacks drafted since 1998, 72 signal
callers participated in at least 100 plays in a single season
once. If we look at this by years of experience, we have 43
quarterbacks with 100 plays in their first year in the NFL.
In second year we see 50 observations, while in year three
and year four there were 32 and 30 observations, respec-
tively. After year four, though, we have 21 or fewer
observations. The scarcity of observations indicates that we
can only focus on what a quarterback did his first four
seasons.
With data sets in hand, we estimated the following
model:
NFLPERFORMANCE¼ b0 þ b1 Heightþ b2 BMI
þ b3 BMI2 þ b4 Wonderlicþ b5  40YardDashTime
þ b6 Dummyfornon-Division I-Aquarterbacksþ b7
COLLEGEPERFORMANCEþ et ð4Þ
where Performance is measured as
Wins Produced per 100 plays
QB Rating
18 With respect to QB Rating, blacks posted an average mark of
100.6 versus 92.6 for whites. For QB Score per play, Net points per
play, and Wins Produced per 100 play the differences were 3.676
versus 3.021, 0.311 versus 0.257, and 0.818 versus 0.673,
respectively.
19 One potential issue is that there is very little variation in college
performance. After all, only the quarterbacks who are considered the
best in college get a chance to play in the NFL. To address this issue
we looked at quarterbacks from 1998 to 2007 that were both drafted
and logged at least 100 plays in a single NFL regular season. In all we
had 215 NFL season observations. The standard deviation in QB
Score per play, Net Points per play, Wins Produced per 100 plays, and
QB Rating in the NFL was 1.054, 0.086, 0.231, and 14.45,
respectively. For these quarterbacks the standard deviation for these
same stats in college was 1.001, 0.081, 0.219, and 15.47. In sum, with
respect to QB Score, Net Points, and Wins Produced we see slightly
less variation in the college numbers. For QB Rating, though, the
college numbers have a greater level of variation.
20 We also regressed PICK on just the college performance numbers.
When we regress PICK on aggregate college performance numbers
Footnote 20 continued
(QB Score, Net Points, or Wins Produced) we are able to explain 7%
of the variation in draft position. When we consider the per play
measures and career plays, our explanatory power rises to 9%.




Passing Yards per Attempt (Note: If NFL Performance
was measured as Wins Produced per 100 plays, then
college performance was also Wins Produced per 100
plays. The same story can be told for each of our
performance metrics.)
With four levels of experience, and multiple definitions of
performance, we were able to estimate Eq. (4) many times.21 In
all of our formulations, we never found that the combine fac-
tors, or the college performance with respect to Wins Produced
per 100 plays or QB rating, had a significant impact—of the
expected sign—on NFL Wins Produced per play or NFL QB
Rating at any level of experience in the NFL.22
When we look at the single metrics (completion per-
centage, yards per attempt, touchdowns per attempt,
interceptions per attempt), we do find that college com-
pletion percentage has a statistically significant and posi-
tive impact on completion percentage at each level of
experience.23 As for the other single metrics, we again did
not find any statistically significant explanatory variables
for yards per attempt or TD per attempt.24 Interceptions per
attempt were positively impacted by being a non-Division
I-A player in the first year of a player’s career. Also in the
first year, a higher BMI was found to reduce interceptions
per attempt. But no other factor had a statically significant
impact on interceptions per attempt.25
To summarize our results, it appears that completion
percentage in college tells us something about completion
percentage in the NFL. On the surface, this does suggest
that passers who were accurate in college remain accurate
in their professional football careers. One should note,
though, that college completion percentage explains less
than 20% of the completion percentage we observe in the
NFL. Consequently, it does not follow from our analysis
that quarterbacks fail to develop in terms of accuracy as
they move up into the professional ranks. We believe this is
because college and professional league competitions vary
greatly in terms of overall levels and heterogeneity of
talent available, the degree and quality of competition, and
speed and intensity of play. In any case, our examination of
the factors that determine draft position indicated that
completion percentage in college was not considered
important on draft day. The factors that do appear impor-
tant—height, Wonderlic score, and 40 yard dash times—do
not appear to have an impact on future NFL performance.
Of course, NFL scouts will be experienced and trained to
recognize intangible features of quarterback play, such as
leadership qualities and ability to perform against defensive
pressure that may not be captured by either college per-
formance statistics or combine data. We can check whether
scouting data help explain eventual NFL performance by
the following method. First, we regress draft pick on college
performance (here selected as net points) and other vari-
ables shown in Eq. (3). We save the residuals; these rep-
resent everything that went into selecting the player that we
did not have in the original model. We suggest that these
residuals capture scouting data, although other unobserva-
bles will be present. Next we regress NFL performance on
the same variables used in the draft pick model plus NFL
experience. This will tells us whether the omitted scouting
variables are really important or not. We find that the
coefficient on residuals in the NFL net points equation is -
0.182 with a t-statistic, computed using robust standard
errors, of 2.49. The R-squared in the net points model rises
from 0.23 without residuals to 0.27 with residuals. Overall,
this does suggest that less tangible scouting data do matter
for explaining the variation in NFL quarterback perfor-
mance, although the explanatory power of scouting—as it
has been measured—appears rather small.
As a final experiment, we estimated a two stage least
squares model in which draft pick was determined by Eq.
(3) above in the first stage. In the second stage we estimated:
NFL PERFORMANCE ¼ c0 þ c1  NFL experience
þ c2  NFL experience2 þ c3  Pick þ et ð5Þ
The sample used for estimation was a set of 59 quarter-
backs who had at least 100 plays in the NFL in a given season,
with pooled observations over the period 1998–2007. Since
we have multiple observations for most quarterbacks, the
standard errors were clustered by quarterback. This corrects
for interdependence of errors within quarterbacks, while
preserving independence of errors across quarterbacks.
21 There did not appear a simple way to present all of these
regressions in a table. The results, though, are available from the
authors upon request.
22 The Wonderlic score was statistically significant for 1 year of
experience, but when this happened the sign was negative. In other
words, higher Wonderlic scores were associated with lower levels of
performance.
23 When we estimate Eq. (4) with completion percentage as the
performance metric, we find that college completion percentage is
statistically significant. But the model’s adjusted r-squared is only
0.18. In other words, much of the variation in an NFL’s quarterback’s
completion percentage is not related to what that player did in college.
Furthermore, the estimated elasticity of NFL completion percentage
relative to college completion percentage is only 0.34. So a 10%
increase in a player’s completion percentage in college only leads to a
3.4% improvement in what the player will do in the NFL. Such results
suggest that although college completion percentage has statistical
significance, the economic significance of this factor is quite small.
24 We did find that Wonderlic had a negative impact on touchdowns
per attempt during the first year of experience.
25 We also considered NFL career performance after 3 years (to hold
experience constant) as a dependent variable. We further experi-
mented with college career plays as an explanatory variable. The
results of estimation were little different.
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The results of estimation of Eq. (5) are reported in
Table 6. Regardless of the selected NFL performance
metric, experience determines performance independently
of draft pick, with no significant role for draft choice. Put
another way, comparing two quarterbacks with same NFL
experience, the player selected earlier in the draft is not
predicted to have significantly different NFL performance
levels than a player picked later in the draft. Draft pick is
not a significant predictor of NFL performance.
7 Concluding observations
We began with nearly four decades of data on NFL per-
formance and where a quarterback was taken in the NFL
draft. Our analysis revealed that there was a relationship
between aggregate performance and where a player was
chosen. But when we looked at per play performance, the
relationship between production and draft position was
quite weak. In contrast, a much stronger relationship
existed between how many plays a quarterback ran and
where he was selected. In sum, draft position can get a
quarterback on the field. But quarterbacks taken higher do
not appear to perform any better.
This finding led us to investigate the factors that determine
where a player was chosen in the draft. Our study indicated
that it was the combine factors that dominated the decision.
College performance did impact where a quarterback was
taken, but performance on the field was dominated by factors
like height, Wonderlic score, and 40 yard dash times.
Our study of subsequent NFL performance—which was
hampered by a lack of data—failed to find that the combine
factors had much of an impact on future performance. In
essence, NFL decision-makers can be impressed by taller,
smarter, and faster signal callers. But there is no evidence
that the extra inches, better test scores, or faster 40 yard
dash times make any difference in subsequent NFL per-
formance. Indeed, as Table 6 shows, overall, draft pick is
not a significant predictor of NFL performance.
Of course one can argue that our model designed to
predict draft position and NFL performance is incomplete
and our discussion of intangible scouting data does suggest
that there are omitted scouting variables in our model. NFL
decision-makers are also able to interview the candidates
and look at factors such as arm strength and accuracy in
passing drills. Also, we have focused on the position in NFL
which is hardest to assess and where eventual NFL success
is hardest to predict. Quarterbacks are multi-skilled and
have complex mental and physical tasks to perform on the
field. In contrast, running backs and offensive line players
have roles that are more narrowly defined. It may be that,
for example, it is easier to predict the eventual NFL career
performance of college offensive lineman somewhat easier
than for quarterbacks.
However, two key points emerge from out study. First,
college football is very dissimilar as a competition to the
NFL. Second, the combine puts an aspirant NFL player into
an artificial training environment where league competition
is absent. Both factors mean that is extremely difficult for
NFL franchises to assess player talent at point of draft and
generate efficient matching of that talent to NFL rosters. We
should also stress that when we look at nearly 40 years of
data, we fail to find a relationship between where a quar-
terback is selected and his subsequent NFL performance on
a per-play level. So although NFL decision-makers may
consider more factors than we offer in our models, there is
little evidence that these additional factors help NFL deci-
sion-makers make better forecasts of future performance.
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